179 Cal.App.3d 1216 (1986)
225 Cal. Rptr. 234
In re the Marriage of KATHERINE S. and
JOHN EUGENE HARRISON.
JOHN EUGENE HARRISON, Respondent,
KATHERINE S. HARRISON, Appellant.
Docket No. D000640.
Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division
April 18, 1986.
Edwin A. Johnson for
1222*1222 Roy B. Garrett and
James A. Hennenhoefer for Respondent.
WIENER, Acting P.J.
Katherine S. Harrison
(Katherine) appeals portions of the August 23, 1982, interlocutory judgment
dissolving her 65-month marriage (Feb. 2, 1974 to June 27, 1979) to John Eugene
Harrison (Eugene) and the April 22, 1983, order terminating spousal support,
denying attorney fees and setting the value of stock and dividends from the
Loral Corporation, Eugene's employer. We reject Katherine's challenge to the
court's valuation of stock obtained through Eugene's exercise of the Loral
stock options. We conclude the court's formula establishing the community
interest in the Loral stock was within its equitable discretion and Katherine's
acceptance of the cash benefits of the order precludes her receiving her
community interest in shares of stock. We also decide the court acted within
its discretion in terminating spousal support; erred in ordering a stepdown
amount of spousal support for a nine-month period, in granting Eugene an Epstein
credit (see post, p. 1229) and in denying attorney's fees. We therefore
affirm in part, reverse and modify in part, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
THE STOCK OPTIONS
For convenience and brevity
we include only the relevant portion of the procedural and factual background
in our discussion of the respective issues. We start with what we believe is
the principal issue: whether the court properly characterized and valued
Katherine's community interest in the Loral stock.
This case was tried in fits
and starts. The first two days of trial on Eugene's second amended petition for
dissolution were on November 26, 1980, and December 1, 1980. Katherine then
successfully moved to bifurcate the issues of Eugene's deferred compensation
and Loral stock options so she could depose Loral's vice-president and
secretary in New York. Trial started again on February 17, 1981, and proceeded
through February 19. The deposition was received in evidence. The court found
the stock options were "golden handcuffs," granted by Loral to
encourage Eugene to stay with the company. On February 19, 1981, following oral
argument the court asked 1223*1223 counsel to file briefs on the stock option
and tax issues. The case was to be set for further argument.
After reviewing the
supplemental briefs the court apportioned the stock options in accordance with
a formula based on the following factors: the time Eugene worked for Loral after
the granting of each option, the date on which Eugene's right to exercise the
option vested, and the date of separation. The formula is set out in full
On April 22, 1983, the court
heard additional testimony on the value of the parties' community interest in
the stock as determined by the formula.
The evidence presented during
the bifurcated proceedings which occurred in 1980-1981 established Eugene had four
option agreements to purchase Loral stock. Option No. 1, dated January 29,
1975, was a qualified 1971 stock option plan giving Eugene the right on
specified dates to buy 2,500 shares of Loral stock in 25 percent increments at
$3.56 a share. Before separation Eugene exercised his rights under this option
in January 1977, 1978 and 1979. He exercised the balance of his last option
right in January 1980. Eugene received 5,000 shares reflecting a two-for-one
Options Nos. 2, 3, and 4 were
nonqualified stock option agreements issued under Loral's 1976 and 1978
stock option plans. Each option was granted before separation. Under each
option Eugene had the immediate right to buy stock. Any stock purchased,
however, was subject to certain restrictions including forfeiture of the stock
depending upon events described in greater detail later in this opinion.
1224*1224 At trial Betty
White, a certified public accountant, testified for Eugene on the meaning of
the stock options. She also testified at the April 22, 1983, hearing from an
exhibit she prepared containing details of the respective options and the value
of the stock applying the formula. At the conclusion of that hearing the court
found White's exhibit properly applied the formula contained in the
interlocutory judgment of dissolution. At all times Katherine's efforts at
valuation focused on the stock rather than the options. The court ordered
"the value of the community interest [in the Loral stock] is $85,703 minus
imbalance [and] credits." On May 22, 1983, Eugene paid Katherine $67,142
pursuant to the court's order representing the balance of Katherine's community
interest in the stock and dividends obtained by exercise of the stock options.
(1a) Katherine incorrectly
argues the court erred when it decided "the only proper way to divide the
stock option benefits is on a time basis." Although the formula is
technically incorrect because it fails to recognize the distinction between qualified
and nonqualified options as well as the differences between the options
themselves and stock purchased pursuant to the options, we nonetheless agree
with the trial court that a time formula was proper. We first consider the
difficulties created by these semantic inaccuracies.
Under option No. 1 Eugene had
the right to buy nonforfeitable Loral stock in increments of 25 percent on
specified dates extending over a period of four years; the option could not be
exercised until the specified dates occurred. Option Nos. 2, 3, and 4 gave
Eugene different rights. Under these options he could purchase 100 percent of
the stock covered by the option on the day the option was granted. However, any
stock issued pursuant to the nonqualified options was restricted. The restrictions
provided that stock issued to any employee upon exercise of the options was to
be forfeited to the corporation if the employee were terminated for cause or
were to leave voluntarily without corporate consent. The forfeiture provisions
lapsed in 20 percent increments starting two years after the stock was issued.
The forfeiture provisions did not apply if the employee died, was terminated
without cause, or left corporate employment voluntarily with corporate consent.
(2) In family law cases
involving retirement benefits "vested" has been defined as "a
pension right which is not subject to a condition of forfeiture if the
employment relationship terminates before retirement." (In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 842 [126 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561, 94 A.L.R.3d 164].) (1b) Eugene's
nonqualified stock options present 1225*1225 an analagous situation. Those
options gave Eugene the vested unconditional right to buy Loral stock on the
date the options were issued subject to the restrictions described above on any
stock purchased. Because Eugene could lose some or all of the stock if he were terminated
for cause or were to resign without corporate consent any restricted stock he
purchased was not vested. Only the options were vested. Thus the
formula's denominator is wrong. The denominator refers to the total number of
days from the granting of the option until the option becomes fully
vested. Because the option itself fully vests at the time of its grant, a
literal application of this formula results in a denominator of one. With a
denominator of one the ratio defining the community interest exceeds 100
percent — a non sequitur in the context of community property. As we explain,
however, this error does not require reversal. Reasonably interpreted, the
court's reference to vesting in the formula was not to the option date but to
the date on which the restrictions on the stock issued pursuant to the
option were removed. The court's use of "vested" as applied to the
stock was proper. Consistent with the court's intent, the denominator of the
formula should be modified to delete "option" and insert "stock
received pursuant to the exercise of the option." The question remains
whether the modified formula is correct, and if so, whether it was correctly
There were innumerable
difficulties faced by the trial court in attempting to value Katherine's
community interest in the Loral stock. Inexplicably Katherine presented no
evidence on the value of the option itself.
concern at trial was the value of Loral stock under Eugene's control. She
stressed that since Eugene controlled the options she could lose value in the
stock by his electing to forego what she thought would be valuable
opportunities. (See In re Marriage of Gillmore (1981) 29 Cal.3d 418 [174 Cal. Rptr.
493, 629 P.2d 1].) In addition, the court's efforts at achieving an
equitable valuation and division of the stock were guided only by general
principles; there were no appellate cases dealing with stock options. In re Marriage of Hug (1984) 154 Cal. App.3d 780 [201 Cal.
Rptr. 676] now provides a lengthy discussion on the factors that
should control in determining community interest in qualified stock options.
(See also In 1226*1226 re Marriage of Nelson (1986)
177 Cal. App.3d 150 [222 Cal. Rptr. 790].) The general principles
considered by the court included the following.
(3) "... [E]ach spouse's
time, skill, and labor are community assets, and whatever each spouse earns
from them during marriage is community property." (In re Marriage of Shea (1980) 111 Cal. App.3d 713, 717 [169
Cal. Rptr. 490].) After separation earnings and accumulations of a
spouse are separate property. (Civ. Code, § 5118.) Fringe benefits are not a
gift from the employer but are earned by the employee as part of the
compensation for services. (In re Marriage of Fithian (1974) 10 Cal.3d 592, 596 [111 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 517 P.2d 449], disapproved on other grounds in In re Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 851.) Thus
fringe benefits such as employee retirement, employer-paid life insurance and
employee stock options are community property to the extent they are earned by
the time, skill and effort of a spouse during marriage. (Id., at p. 842;
In re Marriage of Hug, supra, 154 Cal. App.3d at p. 791;
Patillo v. Norris (1976) 65 Cal.
App.3d 209, 217 [135 Cal. Rptr. 210].) (4a) Fringe benefits
consisting of contractual rights to future benefits after separation, though
unvested and unmatured, are property subject to allocation between community
and separate interests at the time of dissolution. (In re Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 844, 846.)
While the "time rule" is the method most frequently used in
allocating benefits earned in part during marriage (In re Marriage of Judd (1977) 68 Cal. App.3d 515, 522 [137
Cal. Rptr. 318]) the time rule is appropriate only where the amount
of benefits is substantially related to the number of years of employment. (In re Marriage of Poppe (1979) 97 Cal. App.3d 1, 8-9 [158
Cal. Rptr. 500].) (5) With respect to benefits payable after
separation, the employee spouse may not by unilateral election transmute
community property into separate property in an effort to deprive the spouse of
an interest in retirement benefits without compensating that spouse for the
interest lost as a result of the election. (In re Marriage of Gillmore, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 423-424, 426;
In re Marriage of Stenquist (1978) 21 Cal.3d 779, 782 [148 Cal.
Rptr. 9, 582 P.2d 96].)
(6) In re Marriage of Hug, supra, 154 Cal. App.3d 780,
applies these general principles in devising a formula to allocate community
and separate property interests in stock options granted during marriage and
exercisable after separation. Hug explains there may be a number of
factors which prompt companies to offer stock options including but not limited
to attracting and retaining qualified personnel in addition to compensating
employees for both past and future services. (Id., at pp. 785-787.) The
characterization of a stock option as compensation for past or future services
or both turns on the circumstances involved in the granting of that particular
option. (Id., 1227*1227 at p. 786.) "[N]o single rule or formula is
applicable to every dissolution case involving employee stock options.... [T]he
trial court should exercise its discretion to fashion an equitable allocation
of separate and community interests in employee stock options exercisable by
the employee spouse after the date of separation of the parties." (Id.,
at pp. 792-793.) (4b) However, the "time rule" may not be the
appropriate method of valuation where a stock option is publicly traded or
otherwise capable of valuation. (Id., at p. 794.) (1c) Katherine points
out that unlike Hug the court here calculated both the numerator and
denominator from the date the Loral stock options were issued to Eugene, not
from the commencement of his employment. We appreciate the effect this
difference will have on the community property percentage in the options. But
the fact that there is a difference does not necessarily mean the court erred.
Here, the court was satisfied that the option represented "golden
handcuffs" to assure Eugene would stay with Loral. That finding is
unchallenged. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Nelson, supra, at p. 155, fn. 4.)
Admittedly, the record is
sparse on the issue of Loral's specific reasons for granting the options. There
was no evidence to indicate the stock options were a factor in initially
attracting Eugene to Loral or that they were granted as deferred compensation
for past services. Based on this record, the stock options reflected Eugene's
time, skill and effort beginning on the date the options were granted. That
date may have reflected a change in Loral's personnel policy without regard to
past performance of its key employees. It may also have reflected Loral's
management decision to use the stock options to attract new employees in the
future. Nonetheless there is a logical basis for use of the date the options
were granted. We therefore defer to the trial court's broad discretion. (In re Marriage of Poppe, supra, 97 Cal. App.3d at p. 11.)
(7) Katherine's last quarrel
with the treatment of Loral stock is that the court erred in using an effective
rate of 61 percent to determine the federal and state income tax impact on the
net gain apportioned between the parties. The court's finding on this issue is
supported by the evidence presented at the April 22, 1983, hearing.
Pursuant to Internal Revenue
Code section 83(a), stock transferred in connection with the
performance of services is included in gross income "at the first time the
rights of the person having the beneficial interest in 1228*1228 such property
are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture." (§ 83(a)(1), italics supplied.) The amount included in gross
income is the fair market value of such property at the time it was
transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture over the amount
paid for such property. (§ 83(a)(1), (2).) A "substantial risk of
forfeiture" exists when the right in the property transferred is
conditioned, directly or indirectly, upon the future performance of substantial
services and the possibility of forfeiture exists if such condition is not
satisfied. (§ 83(c)(1); 26 C.F.R. § 1.83-3(c).) Pursuant to these provisions of
Internal Revenue Code, Eugene incurred a tax liability on the date each
restriction was removed on stock issued pursuant to option Nos. 2, 3, and 4.
White's exhibit identified each of these dates, the market value on each date
and Eugene's tax liability. Using the formula the court determined the net gain
and awarded Katherine cash equal to her proportional interest in that sum.
Based on this record the court properly determined Eugene's tax liability.
Moreover White's testimony on the tax treatment of restricted stock was
consistent with the court's earlier findings that the stock should be valued on
the date the restrictions were removed, i.e., the date on which the stock
irrevocably vested in Eugene.
(8) Katherine also belatedly
argues that the court erred in awarding her cash rather than a proportional
interest in the stock itself. We say "belatedly" because Katherine
ignores her specific request at trial for cash "forthwith." Because
the court honored her request, she is precluded from obtaining her
proportionate interest in the stock. (Turner v. Markham (1907) 152 Cal.
246, 247 [92 P. 485]; Wilson v. Wilson (1958) 159 Cal.
App.2d 330, 334 [323 P.2d 1017].) We also reject Katherine's claim
the court erred in failing to reconsider its characterization and valuation of
the stock options.
(9) Katherine correctly
contends the court erred in granting Eugene Epstein credits (In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76 [154 Cal. Rptr.
413, 592 P.2d 1165]) for repaying the balance of a bank loan,
$21,800, borrowed before separation to purchase Loral stock under Option Nos. 2
and 3. Because the court determined a time formula was the proper way to
apportion the community interest in the stock received pursuant to these
options that same percentage should have been used to determine the Epstein
credit. According to our calculations since 55 percent of the stock represents
the community interest only $11,990 should have been allowed Eugene as a
credit. Accordingly the judgment should be modified to award Katherine an
Katherine raises several
arguments with reference to the court's treatment of spousal support. She
asserts the court abused its discretion in "repeatedly refus[ing] to rule
on the spousal support issue," ultimately terminating jurisdiction, and
providing for stepdown spousal support. We first discuss Katherine's contention
the court "repeatedly refused to rule on the spousal support issue."
(10) Following the order to
show cause hearing on October 26, 1979, the court ordered Eugene to pay spousal
support of $800 monthly, the trust deed payment on the family residence
($168.35), real property insurance, maintenance including gardener and pool
service, and all utility bills. The court also ordered Eugene to pay
Katherine's medical and dental bills including prescriptions. Katherine's
financial declaration showed monthly expenses of $1,593. The court's order
awarded her approximately $1,150 monthly.
The interlocutory judgment of
dissolution continued the $800 monthly support order plus the house payment and
medical insurance from February 19, 1981, to August 19, 1981. Spousal support
was then reduced to $400 monthly, the house payment and medical insurance. The
$400 monthly 1230*1230 spousal support and house payment were to continue from
February 19, 1982, until May 19, 1982, but after February 1981 Eugene was to
pay Katherine's medical insurance in excess of $50 monthly. After May 1982 the
court ordered $5,000 as an advance of community property to be characterized at
a later hearing for the purpose of assisting Katherine. At the April 22, 1983,
hearing the court terminated jurisdiction to award further spousal support.
Based on this record, there is simply no basis for Katherine's claim the court
repeatedly refused to award her support.
Did the court correctly
terminate jurisdiction over spousal support?
(11) A trial court has broad
discretion in setting both the amount and duration of spousal support upon the
dissolution of marriage. (In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 454 [143 Cal.
Rptr. 139, 573 P.2d 41].) The court's discretion is abused only when
it "exceeds the bounds of reason" in light of all of the
circumstances. (In re Marriage of Andreen (1978) 76 Cal. App.3d 667, 671 [143
Cal. Rptr. 94].) A court must consider several factors in making a
spousal support order (Civ. Code § 4801, subd. (a)) including the duration of
the marriage and the ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful
employment. (In re Marriage of Vomacka (1984) 36 Cal.3d 459, 467-468 [204
Cal. Rptr. 568, 683 P.2d 248]; In re Marriage of Neal (1979) 92 Cal. App.3d 834, 846 [155
Cal. Rptr. 157].)
(12) Here, spousal support
which started October 26, 1979, continued in more or less the same amount for
over 18 months at which time it continued on a reduced basis for an additional
nine months. The court retained jurisdiction over spousal support until April
22, 1983, almost four years from the date of separation. In ruling on spousal
support the court explained it was aware of Katherine's epileptic condition,
but found she was employable. The record supports the court's findings.
Katherine was 33 when the parties separated. She had worked before marriage.
Medication was effective to stabilize her condition. Although Katherine had not
sought work since separation due to her own concern about possible seizures and
her nervousness about the divorce, she was licensed to drive, regularly cared
for neighborhood children, attended Palomar College, and had made five trips to
visit her family in New York. On this evidence we cannot say the court exceeded
its discretion in terminating spousal support.
(13) We have more concern
with the order reducing spousal support from $800 to $400 effective August 19,
1981, which continued for nine months through May 1982. Orders for changes in support
effective in the future must be based upon reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence and not mere speculative expectations. (In re Marriage of Smith (1978) 79 Cal. App.3d 725, 740 [145
Cal. Rptr. 205].) During the period 1231*1231 spousal support
obligation continues it must be based upon the realities of the situation,
specifically the income and expenses of the respective parties. Here an award
of $800 per month as spousal support was consistent with Katherine's needs.
There was no factual basis for the reduction of that amount to $400. The
judgment is modified to require Eugene to pay Katherine $3,600 representing the
difference between the spousal support orders for the nine months in question.
Katherine claims the court
abused its discretion in failing to award reasonable attorney's fees, court
costs and expert witness fees.
At the order to show cause
hearing the court ordered Katherine's counsel to be paid $1,200 from a
community property savings account. On February 19, 1981, the court ordered a
$5,000 "credit ... in regard to the distribution of community
property" as additional fees and refused to reimburse counsel for the New
York attorney's fee for the deposition. The interlocutory judgment ordered
Eugene to pay Katherine's counsel $2,000. On April 22, 1983, the court denied
Katherine's request for attorney's fees and court costs.
(14) Civil Code section 4370
authorizes an award of attorney's fees in a dissolution proceeding. The court
must evaluate each party's needs to insure that both parties will have their
day in court. (In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 514, 525 [160
Cal. Rptr. 379].) The fact that a spouse has separate property does
not necessarily negate need since a spouse is not required to impair the capital
of his or her separate estate in order to defray litigation costs. (In re Marriage of Stephenson (1984) 162 Cal. App.3d 1057, 1090
[209 Cal. Rptr. 383].) The same considerations apply to
postdissolution proceedings. (Civ. Code, § 4370; In re Marriage of Sullivan (1984) 37 Cal.3d 762, 768 [209 Cal.
Rptr. 354, 691 P.2d 1020].) Fees are awarded to provide one of the
parties with an amount adequate to properly litigate the controversy where
(15) Recognizing an award of
attorney's fees and costs in dissolution proceedings is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court (In re Marriage of Lopez (1974) 38 Cal. App.3d 93, 113 [113
Cal. Rptr. 58]), we conclude here there is insufficient evidence to
support the court's order. Eugene's 1232*1232 financial declaration submitted
at the April 22, 1983, hearing showed gross monthly income in excess of
$12,000. His September 1981 declaration showed gross monthly income of
approximately $7,000. Katherine's only income was her spousal support. Eugene
had the ability to pay. Katherine had the need.
Katherine's counsel submitted
itemized declarations showing 293.7 hours devoted to this case excluding the
three days of trial in February 1981 and the full day of trial on April 22,
1983. Statements of itemized costs showed Katherine expended $4,270.04 to
litigate the matter including the cost for the New York deposition. In light of
the extensive time devoted, the difficulty and novelty of the issues, the need
to depose the witness in New York and the accompanying costs for that
deposition, a $2,000 award of attorney's fees is inadequate. The judgment is
reversed for a determination of a reasonable attorney's fee to be awarded to
Katherine's counsel. We have considered and decline to order attorney's fees
for either party on this appeal.
The judgment denying
attorney's fees is reversed. The judgment is modified to order John Eugene
Harrison to pay Katherine S. Harrison $3,600 additional spousal support plus
$9,810 reimbursement for incorrectly determined Epstein credits for a
total of $13,410. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. Each party
shall bear his or her respective costs for this appeal.
Lewis, J., and Adams, J.,[*] concurred.
A petition for a rehearing
was denied May 14, 1986, and appellant's petition for review by the Supreme
Court was denied July 9, 1986.
 "[Katherine's] share is to be obtained by creating
a fraction, the numerator of which will be the total number of days between the
signing or granting of the option agreement and the date of separation, the
denominator of which will be the total number of days from the signing or
granting of the option agreement and the day on which each portion of the
option became fully vested and not subject to divestment. The ratio created by
such fraction will be divided into the gain on the stock option on the date of
exercise to determine the community property interest therein after
reimbursement for the purchase of the option and any taxes paid by [Eugene]
thereon in connection with the exercise of the option. All remaining interest
in any stock option agreement not a part of this said ratio is confirmed as the
sole and separate property of [Eugene]. [¶] ... [T]he basis for determining
[Katherine's] interest goes only to the gain on the stock option plan after the
costs of the purchase of the stock option by [Eugene] and any taxes paid
thereon are repaid to [Eugene].... [¶] THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that since
[Katherine] could not exercise any option rights, her tax position is not
relevant to the basis and formulation of the gain attributable to each stock
option. Accordingly, such formulas should be applied and calculated as to each
option to determine the share of any profit therefrom in the community estate
and thusly to [Katherine]. If [Eugene] does not choose to or cannot sell shares
obtained through his stock option rights, he shall be required to pay to
[Katherine] that portion of the gain that would have occurred on the first date
in which each portion of each option could have been exercised. The court
relies on In re Gilmore [sic] (1981) 29 Cal.3d 418 as authority
on this premise."
 Options to buy or sell listed stock, puts and calls, are
regularly traded on listed exchanges. This record does not disclose why
Katherine's counsel failed to present evidence on the value of Eugene's vested
options. We suspect that there soon will be a case in which one spouse will
focus on the value of the vested option and the other spouse will argue the
value of the restricted stock issued pursuant to that option highlighting the
element of postseparation efforts. Whether expert witnesses will testify that
the option and stock have the identical value is a question which is not before
 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are
to the Internal Revenue Code, title 26 United States Code.
 Although we could have based our decision on the
following ground we have declined to do so preferring to reach the merits of
Katherine's contentions. In affirming the court's treatment of the Loral Stock
options we could merely have said that by accepting the benefits of the
judgment Katherine waived her right to appeal on this issue. (Turner v. Markham (1907) 152 Cal.
246, 247 [92 P. 485]; Wilson v. Wilson (1958) 159 Cal.
App.2d 330, 334 [323 P.2d 1017]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed.
1985) Appeals, § 161, p. 171.) Using that reasoning her claim to a share of
dividends and interest from the date dividends were paid would also have been
barred. To support this conclusion we could point to the following.
conclusion of the April 22, 1983, hearing Katherine's counsel argued there was
"no reason to prolong [this case] any further." Eugene could
"sell [his] stock and get the money in five days. You can take the stock
to any ... stockbroker and put it in a margin account, get half the fair market
value the same day." In response to this argument the court set up a
schedule for Eugene's payment by installments of the amount due Katherine.
Eugene paid the sum of $67,142 on May 22, 1983, which included the value of the
stock, dividends and interest from the date the forfeiture provisions lapsed,
less end balance and credits against community property. He mailed his check to
Katherine in a letter clearly identifying what the payment represented.
Katherine did not reject the check nor indicate her acceptance was conditional.
 We determined 55 percent as the community interest in
the stock by dividing the total shares of stock available under these options,
10,800, by the number of shares determined to be community property in
accordance with the formula, 5,939.
 We reject Katherine's contentions the court erred in
characterizing Eugene's $5,000 advance to Katherine as a division of the
 We reject Katherine's claim the court erred when it failed
to reimburse the community $34,664 for child and spousal support paid to
Eugene's first wife from the community checking account. Substantial evidence
supports the court's finding that separate and community bank accounts became
[*] Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.